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INTRODUCTION*

A man and a woman each brutally murdered multiple victims. Both
experienced difficult childhoods. Both received a fair trial and were
sentenced to die by a jury of their peers. Both were convicted in the
State of Texas. Both exhausted all viable appeals. While incarcerated,
one became a model prisoner and religious leader, the other confessed to killing over 600 people and took great delight in recounting
the gruesome details of the crime. Each one attracted national media
attention and was scheduled to die in 1998. Both asked the same governor for clemency. One was granted clemency and the other died by
lethal injection on February 3, 1998.
Some people reading this story would assume that the model prisoner was spared. Others, out of a sense of chivalry, would assume
that the woman was spared. Some would hypothesize that the professed killer of over 600 would be the one lethally injected. All would
be wrong. The principle of clemency is being misused across the
United States and especially in Texas. What started as an act of mercy
has evolved into a process whereby the governor substitutes his judgment for the judgment of a jury.' Likewise, the governor may also
* For the purposes of the introduction, the specific citations are omitted. All
statements are fully cited later in the paper.
1. A main principle of criminal jurisprudence is that a jury should make the determination of guilt. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 36.13 (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 1998). "Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the jury is the exclusive judge
of the facts, but it is bound to receive the law from the court and be governed
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overrule the opinions of several levels of appellate courts.2 The appellate courts, not the governor, should remedy any legal error in the
guilt/innocence phase. Governor Bush has stated that he will exercise
clemency if there are any doubts about a defendant's guilt.3 Once an
individual has been convicted and exhausted all appeals, there should
be no doubt about guilt. The governor must abandon his stand on the
issue of guilt and innocence and require that clemency be granted only
if and when the governor feels mercy is appropriate. If the governor
feels that there are extenuating circumstances and the defendant deserves mercy, then, by all means, it is his prerogative to grant clemency, but it should not be done in a veil of second-guessing the judicial
process.
I.

EVOLUTION OF CLEMENCY IN THE UNITED STATES

The word clemency is simple to define, but difficult to understand.
It has been around in one form or another, arguably since the creation
of the world. Clemency is defined as "[k]indness, mercy, forgiveness,
leniency," and is used "to describe [an] act of [a] governor of [a] state
when he commutes [a] death sentence to life imprisonment, or grants
pardon."4 Synonyms include mercy, charity, and lenity.5 In recent
times, the idea of clemency has become controversial due to the argument that the executive preempts the judicial determination of guilt or
innocence. Although clemency is a hotly debated issue, it remains an
important and powerful tool in the United States system of justice. 6
A. Early Origins of Clemency
While the roots of clemency in the United States descend directly
from the English system,7 clemency by no means started in England.
Arguably, the idea of clemency has been around since the creation of
the world, and several scholars have argued that clemency dates back
to biblical times.8 Rather than the traditional "eye for an eye" punishment that was required at the time, Cain was banished to the Land of
thereby." Id. One of the main principles of criminal jurisprudence is that the guilt or
innocence of an individual is to be determined by a jury of his peers.
2. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 44.02 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998). "A
defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the rules hereinafter
prescribed . . . ." Id.
3. See Ken Herman & Mike Ward, Bush Defends State Process for Clemency,
Resists Changes, Austin Am.-Statesman, Dec. 19, 1998, at Al.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 252 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See WEBSTER'S NEW DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 152 (1984).
6. See generally Coleen E. Klasmeier, Note, Towards a New Understanding of
Capital Clemency and ProceduralDue Process, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1507, 1515 (1995).
7. See SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

1776-1993, at 46-47 (2d ed. 1994).

8. See Stephen E. Silverman, Note, There is Nothing Certain Like Death in Texas:
State Executive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death Row Inmates' Last Appeals, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 384 (1995).
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Nod after he brutally murdered his brother Abel.9 Although the law
demanded his death, he was allowed to live in exile.' °
The Bible is not the only ancient text that refers to the idea of clemency. The ancient societies of Greece and Rome also exercised a form
of mercy."a In Greece, the Athenian Civil War gave the democratic
society of Athens its chance to exercise clemency. 12 The Athenians
used a poll to conclude who should be pardoned. 3 A candidate had
to comply with the process of adeia,' 4 which required the support of
6000 citizens. Because the approval of so many people was required,
clemency was usually reserved for celebrities. 5 The Greeks did not
have a monopoly on the process of clemency. The Romans frequently
used the power, but often for political gain. Perhaps the most famous
example of Roman clemency was Pilate's pardon of Barabas rather
than Jesus. 6 Clemency evolved from these ancient societies, and now
resides in almost every modern country. 7 While there are certain
similarities between these differing systems, the English tradition best
reflects the ideals of clemency as they relate to capital punishment in
9. See id. (citing Genesis 4:8-10, 15-16).
Now Cain said to his brother Abel, "Let's go out to the field." And while
they were out in the field Cain attacked his brother Abel and killed him.
Then the Lord said to Cain, "Where is your brother Abel?" "I don't know,"
he replied. "Am I my brother's keeper?" Then the Lord said, "What have
you done? Listen! Your Brother's blood cries out to me from the ground
... " But the Lord said to him, "Not so; if anyone kills Cain, he will suffer
vengeance seven times over." Then the Lord put a mark on Cain so that no
one who found him would kill him. So Cain went out from the Lord's presence and lived in the land of Nod, east of Eden.
Genesis 4:8-10, 15-16 (NIV); see also Deuteronomy 19:21 (NIV) ("Show no pity, life
for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.").
10. See Silverman, supra note 8, at 384 (citing Genesis 4:16 (NIV)).
11. See id.; see also Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the
Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 583-86 (1991).
12. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 583 (citing N. HAMMOND, A HISTORY OF GREECE
TO 332 B.C. at 446-47 (1967)).
13. See id. at 589 (citing D. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 25859 (SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 150-53 (1978), explaining that Athletes and
Orators were the ones most likely to be granted clemency because so many people
knew them).
14. See id. at 583. The process of adeia is essentially a poll of citizens, but it must
be done in secret. See MAcDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS at 254 (1978).
15. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 583.
16. See id. at 584 & n.83 (discussing John 18:38-40) (King James).
"What is Truth?" Pilate asked. With this he went out again to the Jews and
said, "I find in him no fault at all. But ye have a custom, that I should not
release unto you one at the passover: will ye therefore that I release unto
you the king of the Jews:" Then cried they all again, saying, "not this man,
but Barabas."
John 18:38-40 (NIV).
17. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 575. Of course, it is not always called clemency or
mercy, some countries view the practice with disdain. The same may be said of some
Texans.
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the United States because the laws of the United States were written
by once-loyal subjects of the King. 18
B.

Mercy from the King - Clemency in England

The English system of clemency is the closest in relation to the
United States' because individuals intricately familiar with the English
system of laws wrote the Constitution. 9 While the founding fathers
believed that America should not have a king or queen, 20 they nonetheless felt that clemency power should rest in a chief executive.2 ' In
the Federal arena it would be vested in the President, or in the states
it would be vested in the governor.
Many commentaries have been written about the clemency power
as it existed in England.2 2 Perhaps the most famous author was Sir
William Blackstone, who noted in his commentaries that the Crown's
use of the pardon power, to ensure that justice was administered with
mercy, was one of the greatest advantages of monarchy over any other
type of government because it softened the rigors of the general law. 23
Blackstone recognized the Roman roots of British clemency when he
denounced the cruelty of the inhabitants of the Isle of Gurnsey be24
cause they failed to postpone the execution of a pregnant woman.
His argument was that if there were ever a case for mercy it was the
mercy owed to the unborn child.2 5
The clemency power of the King was absolute in England for 165
years until a dispute occurred over whether the King could pardon the
Treasurer of England who was in the process of being impeached by
Parliament.2 6 The King in fact did grant a pardon, but a frustrated
Parliament succeeded in limiting the royal power with various acts including: the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,27 the 1689 Bill of Rights, 28
18. See Michael A.G. Korengold et al., And Justice for Few: The Collapse of the
Capital Clemency System in the United States, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 349, 354 (1996).
19. See generally MILKINS & NELSON, supra note 7, at 2.
20. See id. at 61.
21. See JAMES IREDELL, ANSWERS TO MASONS OBJECTIONS: MARCUS I-V (1788),
reprinted in DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART ONE 379 (Bernard Bailyn ed.,
1993).
22. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 586.
23. See id. Blackstone observed that acts of clemency "endear the sovereign to his
subjects, and contribute more than any thing to root in their hearts that filial affection
and personal loyalty, which are the sure establishment of a prince." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OF PUBLIC WRONGS, 464-5
(1962).
24. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 585-86. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at
466.
25. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at 465.
26. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 586-87.
27. See id. at 587 (citing Habeas Corpus Act of 1679).
... and the person.. .who shall knowingly frame ... any warrant for such
commitment ... contrary to this act.., shall be disabled from thenceforth to
bear any office of trust or profit within the said realm of England ... and be
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the 1700 Act of Settlement, 9 and finally, in 1721, Parliament gained
the power to pardon by legislative act.3 0
The King's grant of clemency was seldom granted to those incarcerated in error, but was instead extended to win the support of differing
political factions. In some cases, pardons were for sale on the open
market. 31 These transactions were commonplace and eventually led
to vast amounts of criticism. 32 Although the clemency system in England was by no means perfect, this background pervaded the minds of
the drafters of the Constitution.
C.

Federal Clemency Power

The drafters of the Constitution arrived at a concept that, while
British in nature, allowed the chief executive to be elected by the people. This was a great deviation from the centuries of monarchy to
which the British were accustomed. There was much debate among
the delegates of the Constitutional Convention about the purposes
and procedures of executive clemency.33 Ultimately, the Constitution
was ratified and Article II vested the "Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment" entirely in the President.3 4
In the years that have followed, presidents have had little hesitation
in utilizing this power.3 5 Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson granted many pardons at the birth of the country.3 6 President
Lincoln and President Johnson granted pardons for those who fought
incapable of any pardon from the king, his heirs or successors, of the said
forfeitures, losses, or disabilities, or any of them.
Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2, §11 (Eng.), reprinted in WILLIAM S.
CHURCH, A TREATISE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 49 (1884).
28. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 587 (citing Bill of Rights, 1689, W. & M., ch. 2, §2
(Eng.)).
29. See id. (citing 1700 Act of Settlement, 13 H.C. JOUR. 624 (1701); 16 H.L. JOUR.
737 (1701)).
30. See id. (citing Act of Settlement, 1721, 7 Geo. 1, ch. 29 (Eng.)).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 588 (citing 13 H.C. JOUR. 624 (1701); 16 H.L. JOUR. 737 (1701)).
33. See MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 7, at 46-47.
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 1.
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing,
of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United
States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
Id.
35. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 592.
36. See id. at 592-93; see also MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 7, at 84-86. Washington's use of the pardoning power arose after the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. See id.
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against the Union during the Civil War, in exchange for their promise
to uphold the Constitution.3 7
In modern times, the President himself has been pardoned. 38 At the
end of his tenure in office, President George H. Bush pardoned many
of the key players in the Iran-Contra scandal. 39 The pardoning power
of the president is alive and well.
D.

Clemency in the 50 States

In the early American colonies, the hand of the King was always
apparent. 40 Each colony was governed by an administrator who had
been delegated the power of clemency from the King. The American
Revolution provided the emergence of the state government to supplant the governing power of the King. 41 After the Revolutionary
War, the states voted to elect governors. Most individual state constitutions were modeled after the United States Constitution thus, the
power of clemency became vested in the executive office - the state
governors. Some citizens, fearful of the abuses that had occurred in
the past, wished to limit the power of the executive.4 2 Many of the
states limited the pardoning power of the governor by requiring consent of an executive council.43
The structures designed by the early colonies have survived today.
Of the fifty states, twenty-eight place the clemency power in the governor alone, although many have an advisory board that will issue
37. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 593; see also, Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 13, 12
Stat. 589, 592, repealed by Act of Jan 21, 1867, ch. 8, 14 Stat. 377:
[T]he President is hereby authorized, at any time hereafter, by proclamation
to extend to persons who may have participated in the existing rebellion in
any State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at
such time and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public
welfare.
Id.
38. See MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 7, at 349. Gerald Ford's pardon of Richard
Nixon during the Watergate scandal is still considered by many to be the reason Ford
lost the presidency to Jimmy Carter. See id. at 349-351.
39. See Proclamation 6518, Grant of Executive Clemency, 28 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 2382 (Dec. 24, 1992), reprintedin 57 Fed. Reg. 62145 (1992). Iran-Contra
is the term coined for an alleged Hostage for Arms negotiation during the Reagan
years. During the last month of President Bush's term, he pardoned many of those
still under indictment including Weinberger, Clarridge, George, Abrams, Fiers and
McFarlane. See id.; see also Report of the Independent Counsel: Iran-ContraAffair
(visited April 1, 1999) <http://www.webcom.com/pinknoiz/covert/icsummary.html>.
40. See MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 7, at 2-3.
41. See id. at 2.
42. See Korengold, supra note 18, at 355.
43. See SAMUEL BRYAN, REPLY TO WILSON'S SPEECH: CENTINEL II (1787), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART ONE, 77-91 (Bernard Bailyn
ed., 1993). These councils were a result of expanding duties and powers of the governor. The primary concern for the drafters of the constitution was a fear of corruption
in the use of clemency. See id.
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non-binding opinions.4 4 In sixteen states, the governor shares power
with some sort of administrative board.45 In the five remaining states,

a panel, usually appointed by the governor, has the principle authority

to make clemency decisions.4 6 Essentially, this board acts as an executive would. 7
II.

CLEMENCY PROCEDURE IN TEXAS

Texas is one of the sixteen states that utilize the dual power structure for the grant of executive clemency.4 These states use both the
board and the governor and do not rely solely upon one or the other.
They are in fact a hybrid of the aforementioned forms. In these states,
the endorsement of an independent board is required before the governor may grant clemency. In Texas, this panel is the Pardons and
Paroles Board. 49 The states of Arizona5 ° and Pennsylvania 5' stand
alone in that they guarantee some form of hearing before any action is
44. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE CLEMANCY AMONG THE
AMERICAN STATES, NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH, 17-20 tbl. I (1988) [hereinafter GUIDE TO STATE CLEMENCY]. (Comparative

View of Clemency in the United States and Territories). The twenty-nine states are:
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id.
45. See id. The sixteen states are: Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Utah. See id.
46. See id. The five states are: Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, and South
Carolina. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 605; see also TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11.
a) Board of Pardons and Paroles; parole laws; reprieves, commutations
and pardons; remission of fines and forfeitures.
b) The legislature shall by law establish a Board of Pardons and Paroles
and shall require it to keep record of its actions and the reasons for its
actions. The legislature shall have authority to enact parole laws and
laws that require or permit courts to inform juries about the effect of
good conduct time and eligibility for parole or mandatory supervision
on the period of incarceration served by a defendant convicted of a
criminal offense.
c) In all criminal cases, except treason and impeachment, the Governor
shall have power, after conviction, on the written signed recommendation and advice of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, or a majority
thereof, to grant reprieves and commutations of punishment and pardons; and under such rules as the Legislature may prescribe, and upon
the written recommendation and advice of a majority of the Board of
Pardon and Paroles, he shall have the power to remit fines and forfeitures. The Governor shall have the power to grant one reprieve in any
capital case for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days; and he shall have
power to revoke conditional pardons. With the advice and consent of
the legislature, he may grant reprieves, commutations of punishment
and pardons in cases of treason.
Id.
49. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11.
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taken on a particular individual's case. The remaining states at least
have in place a procedure for the institution of clemency.
Texas stands as the maverick state in that the only way an inmate is
given a hearing by the Pardons and Paroles Board is at the total pleasure of the Board.5 2 Nothing in the Texas Constitution or in any enacted statutes requires the Pardons and Paroles Board to act in any
particular instance.5 3 If the Pardons and Paroles Board chooses not to
review a case there is absolutely no avenue for relief. 54 Texas has
been the subject of much debate over how the process is employed.
Sadly, this debate has been largely academic. Since the death penalty
was reinstated in 1976," 5 Texas has never commuted the sentence of a
death row inmate - that is until 1998. Clemency was granted, not for a
model prisoner and born-again Christian, 56 but rather a self-proclaimed killer of over 600.

50. See Silverman, supra note 8, at 387; ARIz. CONST. art. V, § 5: "The Governor
shall have power to grant reprieves, commutation, and pardons after convictions, for
all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with
such restrictions and limitations as may be provided by law." Id.; see also ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 31-402(c)(2) (West 1996).
After a hearing for which the victim, county attorney and presiding judge are
given notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make recommendations to
the governor for commutation of sentence after finding by clear and convincing evidence that the sentence imposed is clearly excessive given the nature of the offense and the record of the offender and that there is a
substantial probability that when released the offender will conform the offender's conduct to the requirements of the law.
Id.
51. See Silverman, supra note 8, at 387; see also PA. CONS. STAT. § 9(a) (amended
1997)
a) In all criminal cases except impeachment the Governor shall have
power to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutation of
sentences and pardons; but no pardon shall be granted, nor sentence
commuted, except on the recommendation in writing of a majority of
the Board of Pardons, and in the case of a sentence of death or life
imprisonment, on the unanimous recommendation in writing of the
Board of Pardons, after full hearing in open session, upon due public
notice. The recommendation, with the reasons therefor at length, shall
be delivered to the Governor and a copy thereof shall be kept on file in
the office of the Lieutenant Governor in a docket kept for that purpose.
Id.
52. See TEX. CONsT. art. IV, § 11.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality opinion) (validating
death penalty statutes).
56. Make no mistake, the author is not advocating that simply because of a death
row conversion should Karla Faye Tucker be given any special consideration. The
point to be made is simply to show that there was a national outcry for mercy due to
her religious conversion.
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A.

Mercy Denied - The Case of Karla Faye Tucker

I come to you a person, an individual, seeking commutation of my
death sentence, sharing with you what I hope you will use in making
your decisions. Please know ...I am in no way attempting to minimize the brutality of my crime. It obviously was very, very horrible
and I do take full responsibility for what'happened the night of June
13, 1983. I know that the choices I made, to do drugs and other
things, led up to my actions that night. I also know that justice and
law demand my life for the two innocent lives I brutally murdered
that night. If my execution is the only thing, the final act that can
fulfill the demand for restitution and justice then I accept that. 7
The case of Karla Faye Tucker brought the eyes of America to the
state of Texas to watch the final hours of a born-again Christian as she
faced her own death at the hands of the state. Lawyers for Karla Faye
Tucker vehemently attacked the constitutionality of the clemency procedure in Texas. They argued that although the condemned has a statutory right to clemency, the fact that there is no history of clemency in
Texas makes commutation de facto58 unavailable. The argument is really quite simple. If no one is ever granted clemency, then it is in fact
unavailable due to the lack of precedent. If the Pardons and Paroles
Board will never give clemency, then their existence is a mockery of
the inmates and attorneys that steadfastly rely upon the Pardons and
Paroles Board. In the end the argument failed for Karla Faye Tucker,
but the principle has picked up steam after her execution.
On June 13, 1983, Jerry Lynn Dean and Deborah Thornton were
brutally murdered while they slept. The murder weapon, a pickax,
was left embedded in Thorton's chest. Investigators quickly arrested
Karla Faye Tucker and Daniel Ryan Garrett. Both were charged and
convicted of capital murder and both sentenced to death.5 9 During
the trial, it was revealed that Tucker and Garrett had broken into
Dean's house with the intent to steal money and motorcycle parts.
They were surprised to find Dean asleep in his bed. Garrett proceeded to beat Dean over the head with a hammer. Tucker then
struck Dean over 20 times to stop the "gurgling sound he was making."" Once realizing that Thorton was under the sheets next to
Dean, Tucker turned the axe on her. Tucker boasted at her trial that
57. See Letter from Karla Faye Tucker to Gov. George W. Bush, reprinted in
AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 22, 1998, at
Al.
58. See Ex parte Karla Faye Tucker, No. 388,428-B (180th Dist. Ct., Harris County,
Tex. Jan. 22, 1992).
Karla Faye Tucker: Challenging Clemency, AUSTIN

59. See Court TV Online, Texas v. Karla Faye Tucker: A Question of Mercy (vis-

ited Oct. 27, 1998) <http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/tucker/background.html>. Garrett died in prison in 1994 of liver disease. See id.
60. Id.
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she experienced an orgasm each time she plunged the axe down upon
her victims.61
The details of this crime, while appalling, demonstrate the severity
of Tucker's crime. Amongst all the factors taken into consideration in
deciding clemency for Karla Faye Tucker, there should be no doubt
about her guilt because in subsequent years she has admitted her role
in the murders. The Tucker case is intriguing, not in the details of the
crime but rather the details of the life after the crime. Karla Faye
Tucker became a model prisoner and converted to Christianity.62
This, in and of itself, does not necessitate a grant of clemency. The
analogy begs the question, "What would a person have to do to receive clemency?" There are really two schools of thought.63 The first
is that her life should be spared because of her conversion and her
steadfast resolve to help other prisoners. Another side of the debate
would simply say that her conversion does not change the fact that
two people died at her hands. Both sides to this argument have valid
propositions, and who is to say which is correct.
Tucker became a celebrity in the months leading up to her death.
She appeared regularly on "Larry King Live" and "The 700 Club."
Thousands of letters were written on her behalf, from average citizens,
Pat Robertson, the homicide detective working the case, Pope John
Paul II, and even from siblings of the victims. 64 Certainly, if someone
deserved clemency then it should be prisoner #777, Karla Faye Tucker.
When clemency was denied, Karla Faye Tucker was executed by lethal injection on February 3, 1998. Before the injection Tucker made
a brief statement: "I am going to be face to face with Jesus now .... I
love all of you very much. I will see you when I get there. I will wait
for you." ' 65 Just hours before the execution, Governor Bush made his
own statement denying a stay in the case. He had previously stated
publicly that, in the evaluation of her case, he would only consider
doubts about guilt and/or whether the trial had been fair. In his statement on February 3, he said, "Like many touched by this case, I have
sought guidance through prayer. I have concluded judgment about
the heart and soul'66 of an individual on death row are best left to a
higher authority.
61. See id.
62. See Herman & Ward, supra note 3, at Al.
63. See generally Paul Whitlock Cobb Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of
CapitalPunishment, 99 YALE L.J. 389, 393-396 (1989) (discussing the factors affecting
Governors as they consider the exercise of clemency).
64. See Court TV Online, supra note 59.
65. See Mike Ward & Rebeca Rodriguez, Texas Executes Tucker, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN,

Feb. 4, 1998, at Al.

66. Gov. George W. Bush, Statement by Governor George W. Bush: Karla Faye
Tucker (Feb. 3, 1998) (visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http://www.governor.state.tx.us/message/
Record98/statement-kft.html> (press release) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law
Review).
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After the execution of Karla Faye Tucker, many considered clemency to be dead in Texas. If Tucker did not warrant clemency, then it
never would be granted. What more could a prisoner do to receive
the grace of the governor and the Pardons and Paroles Board? The
conclusion was that Texas had no room for mercy and that was justified.6 7 If the Pardons and Paroles Board did not wish to exercise
mercy then the principles of clemency remained intact. However, the
Pardons and Paroles Board did not keep clemency intact because they
issued clemency to another convict, not as an act of mercy but rather,
because they doubted his guilt.6 8 Clemency should not be used to
combat doubt. The clemency granted to Henry Lee Lucas changed
the parameters of the debate forever.
B.

Orange Socks Lost - The Case of Henry Lee Lucas

The body was found in a ditch off Interstate 35 near Georgetown,
Texas, just north of Austin. The body was nude except for a pair of
orange socks on her feet. She was young and to this day her identity is
unknown. "I've killed by strangulation, I've killed by knifings, I've
killed by hit and runs, shootings, robberies, hangings, every-every
type of crime, I've done it," 6 9 said Henry Lee Lucas. A drifter, Henry
Lee Lucas, became the center of one of the most bizarre murder investigations in Texas history. Lucas was arrested in Texas and charged
with murdering Becky Powell, his common-law wife, and Kate Rich,
an elderly friend. While in jail, Lucas began confessing. In 1983, Lucas' incredible stories of murder received great interest from law enforcement. Law officials from across the country flooded into Texas
to attend standing room only conferences and to hear about his
crimes. When Lucas finally stopped talking, he had given roughly
3,000 confessions that enabled police to solve 600 murders across the
country. 70 Lucas enjoyed the attention. He would gleefully take police to the crime scene and point out the specifics of the crime. In
return, he would receive hamburgers, milkshakes, and cigarettes.7 '
Later Lucas recanted most of his confessions. He contends that law
enforcement fed him details of the crimes and allowed him to read the
investigative reports to give details in his confessions. 72 Ken Anderson, Williamson County District Attorney and one of the prosecutors
in the Orange Socks case, disputes the allegation that the confessions
67. See Don McLeese, Ultimate Responsibility in the Hands of the Fallible, AUSTIN
Feb. 3, 1998, at B1.
68. See Kathy Walt, Parole Board Recommends Lucas be Spared, HOUSTON
CHRON., June 26, 1998, at 1A.
69. The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, June 23, 1998), available in 1998
WL 13520048.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Walt, supra note 68, at 1A.
AM.-STATESMAN,
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were fictional, stating that "[h]is confession contained information
that only the killer would have known."7 3

In the end, it was an investigation led by the then-Attorney General
of Texas, Jim Mattox, that raised serious doubts about the case of Orange Socks."4 Evidence surfaced that suggested that Lucas was else-

where when Orange Socks was murdered. The Pardons and Paroles
Board concluded that there were serious doubts about Lucas' guilt
and recommended sparing Lucas' life.76 The Governor, following the
Board's recommendation, granted a commutation to Henry Lee
Lucas.
This was the first time since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976
that a prisoner had been granted a reprieve. Ken Anderson stated
that Lucas was "a monster... who was prove[n] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to twelve citizens. The case has been reviewed by
twenty-three judges over the past fourteen years. The only other reason to grant clemency is for reasons
of mercy. There is no one less
' 77
deserving of such than Lucas.
Mr. Anderson raises the essential question in the debate over the
clemency process: should the Governor, by way of the Pardons and
Paroles Board, substitute his judgment for the judgment of a jury? If
that sort of power is allowable, should it not at least be held in check?
Possibly, the power should be used only with consent of the judicial
branch. While Lucas' death sentence was commuted, he is serving six
life sentences for other murders. He will never leave prison, but the
fact that he will not die at the hands of the state has angered many of
his victims' families. 78 Other relatives of victims whose deaths were
attributed to Lucas are outraged at the Texas Rangers Task Force they
say created Henry Lee Lucas.7 9 Joyce Lemons, whose daughter was

murdered in 1975, stated that it took her and her husband four years
to reopen their daughter's case after records showed that Lucas was
lying.80 The murders that Lucas committed forever changed the lives
of his victims' families. Yet, from jail his false confessions tragically
affected the lives of families to which he never had contact with the
victims. While no one doubts that Henry Lee Lucas committed many
horrific crimes, there were doubts about Orange Socks and so his sentence was commuted.8 '
73. See Today Show, supra note 69.
74. See Walt, supra note 68, at 1A.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Walt, supra note 68, at 1A.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. Although justice is blind, the principles of fairness would never allow
someone to be punished for a crime that they did not commit. The author is not
suggesting that Lucas be punished for a crime that he did not commit, or punished
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III.

DUE PROCESS CLEMENCY PROCEDURE

These two cases converged in 1998 to set off a firestorm of debate
concerning the Texas clemency process. The controversy has reached
an international scale with opponents ranging from Pope John Paul II
to Bianca Jagger.8" In addition to the many arguments against the
death penalty in general, a significant number more specifically address the due process requirement as it pertains to clemency proceedings. Does the United States Constitution require due process in
grants of clemency? If it does, then clearly Texas is in violation because inmates are guaranteed no due process whatsoever. The issue is
still debated all over the country and especially in Texas.
To understand the debate, one clear distinction must be made between the two cases discussed above. In the case of Tucker, there is
no doubt about her guilt. In the Lucas case, there are substantial
doubts about his guilt for the crime for which he was convicted. Many
would argue that this distinction alone separates the two cases and
there should be no further comparison. If one agrees that clemency
should be used only as a safeguard to override the determination of
the courts, then perhaps guilt is the only distinction. However, history, precedent, and the United States Supreme Court do not view
clemency as another device to measure guilt. If a governor has doubts
about the guilt or innocence of an individual, then he/she, by the act of
clemency, can substitute his/her judgment for that of the jury and
courts of appeal. Is it acceptable for the clemency power to be arbitrarily exercised? Traditionally, clemency is a method of grace. What
guidelines, if any, should states be required to follow in dispensing this
grace? The United States Supreme Court attempted to promulgate
guidelines for the states to follow concerning clemency procedures.
A.

Supreme Court Guidelines: Ohio Adult Probation Authority
v. Woodard 3

The very first question that must be answered in any due process
debate is whether the Constitutional due process requirement is applicable in a clemency proceeding. The Supreme Court has never clearly
answered the question, but a recent opinion provides great insight.8"
In March of 1998, the Supreme Court took up two issues concerning
the application of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution to clemency proceedings. The court addressed whether an inmate has a protected life or liberty interest in clemency proceedings, thus
because he committed other crimes. The author contends that his guilt in the Orange
Socks case was proven to a jury and withstood the entire appeals process. See id.
82. See John Moritz, Clemency Processin Texas is Upheld: Judge CriticizesSecrecy,
Lifts Two Execution Stays, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 29, 1998, at Al.

83. 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
84. See id.
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necessitating due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
"Eugene Woodard was sentenced to death for aggravated murder
committed during the course of an Ohio carjacking. ''8 6 The Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence and the
Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.8 7 Woodard was
unable to obtain a stay of execution and thereafter, the clemency authority of Ohio commenced a clemency investigation. 8 The clemency
authority informed Woodard that he was entitled to an interview and
a hearing, but rather than request the interview, Woodard objected to
the short notice and requested that the clemency authority provide
assurances that Woodard's counsel could attend and participate in the
interview and hearing. 9 The clemency authority did not respond and
Woodard filed suit in United States District Court. 90
The District Court granted the state's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, however the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 9' The court of appeals applied a
"dual strand" test. 92 The first strand requires that the defendant show
a protected life or liberty interest. 93 The second strand analyzed the
"role of clemency in the entire punitive scheme." 94 Under the first
strand, the court concluded that the respondent had failed to establish
a protected life or liberty interest. 95 The court cited many Supreme
Court cases that clearly supported the principle that there is no life or
liberty interest in clemency at.the state or federal level. 96 The court of
appeals agreed that there is a due process requirement for clemency
procedures.9 7 The court held that because clemency was far from the
procedure of a trial, then the process due could in fact be minimal.98
The Supreme Court stated the court of appeals found that although
85. See id. at 1247. The second issue before the court is whether participating in an
interview for clemency violates an inmate's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See id. For the purposes of this discussion, the second issue will be omitted as it is not germane.

86. Id.
87. See State v.Woodard, 623 N.E.2d 75 (Ohio 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246
(1994).

88. See Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 107 F.3d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir.

1997).

89. See id. at 1182.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 1194.
id. at 1182.
id.
id. at 1186.

95. See id.; see also Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 277

(1998).

96. See Woodard, 107 F.3d at 1183-86 (citing Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
97. See Woodard, 107 F.3d at 1182-83.

98. See id. at 1183-84.
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clemency "was not required by the Due Process Clause, [clemency]
was a significant, traditionally available remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice when judicial process was exhausted." 99 Therefore,
the Supreme Court indicated the appellate court's conclusions fell
under "the Evitts'0 framework as an 'integral' part of the adjudicatory system."''1 The Evitts Court, however, refused to decide what
the minimal process would be and remanded the case to the district
court for that purpose. °2
The Supreme Court summarily rejected the Court of Appeals' argument as to the first strand of the analysis.' 0 3 The Supreme Court concluded that clemency was totally an act of grace from the executive
and as such was not a protected life or liberty interest.0 4 While the
first strand posed no intrigue to the court, the second strand was given
much consideration. 0 5 The court of appeals relied
heavily on Evitts v.
°7
Lucey' 0 6 to support the due process argument.
Evitts addressed a prisoner's right to effective assistance of counsel
on an appeal of right.1 0 s In the Woodard opinion, the Supreme Court
made clear that the Evitts decision did not create a new "strand" of
due process analysis.1 0 9 Woodard argued clemency and the first appeal of right were substantially similar. 110 The 6 th Circuit Court of Appeals' holding rested on Evitts' argument that clemency was an
integral part of Ohio's system of deciding guilt and innocence; therefore, the clemency process was entitled to due process protection.1 1
The Supreme Court rejected this argument." 2 While a clear majority
of the Supreme Court held that Ohio clemency law did not violate due
process, there was disagreement among the justices about the due process requirement in general." 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas concluded that there was not a
due process requirement in clemency cases.
Clemency proceedings are not part of the trial-or even of the adjudicatory process. They do not determine the guilt or innocence of
99. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 277.
100. See id.; see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (holding that when a state
acts in an area with significant discretionary elements it must act in accord with the
constitution particularly with the due process clause).
101. See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 283.
102. See id. at 277-79.
103. See id. at 284.
104. See id. at 281.
105. See id. at 283.
106. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
107. See Woodard, 107 F.3d at 1186.
108. Id. at 1188.
109. See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 284.
110. See id. at 283.
111. See Woodard, 107 F.3d at 1186.
112. See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 283-85.
113. See id. at 288-89.
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the defendant and are not intended primarily to enhance the reliability of the trial process. They are conducted by the Executive
Branch, independent of direct appeal and collateral relief proceedings. Greeholtz, 443 U.S. at 7-8. And they are usually discretionary,
unlike the more structured and limited scope of judicial proceedings. While traditionally available to capital defendants as a final
and alternative avenue of relief,
clemency has not traditionally
1 14
"been the business of courts."'
Although in agreement with the Court's holding that Ohio clemency law did not violate constitutional due process requirements, Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer disagreed with the
majority about the due process requirement itself. In a concurring
opinion, they contended that there is a minimal requirement for due
process in the United States. The concurring opinion clearly opines
that there should be some minimal procedural safeguards.
A prisoner under a death sentence remains a living person and consequently has an interest in his life. The question this case raises is
the issue of what process is constitutionally necessary to protect that
interest in the context of Ohio's clemency procedures. It is clear
that "once society has validly convicted an individual of a crime and
therefor established its right
to punish, the demands of due process
''115
are reduced accordingly.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion posed two hypotheticals in
which judicial intervention might be warranted: where a state official
merely flipped a coin, or where a state arbitrarily denied a prisoner
any access to its clemency process." 6 Justice Stevens took a harsher
tone and found fault with the opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist.1 17 Justice Stevens contended that, under the majority opinion, a
clemency proceeding could never violate the Due Process Clause.11
He cited instances of "bribery, personal or political animosity, or the
deliberate fabrication of false evidence would be constitutionally acceptable."1'19 Perhaps Justice Stevens' most persuasive argument arrived later in his opinion when he posed the question of a governor
114. Id. at 285 (citing Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464
(1981)). The court compares Woodard with Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-415
(1993), which recognized "the traditional availability and significance of clemency as
part of executive authority, without suggesting that clemency proceedings are subject
to judicial review." Id. Also compared was Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21
(1925), stating "executive clemency exists to provide relief from harshness or mistake
in the judicial system, and is therefore vested in an authority other than the courts."
Id. at 285.
115. Id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment, joined
by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, J.J.) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 429
(1986)).
116. See id. at 289.
117. See id. at 290 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. See id.

119. Id. at 291.
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ignoring the commands of the Equal Protection Clause and using race
or religion in determinations of clemency. Would even this action be
acceptable under the Constitution? Clearly, such an action would go
against the spirit of volumes of case law supporting the Equal Protection Clause. What is unclear, is whether this action would violate the
due process requirement for clemency proceedings. Justice Stevens
argued that under the majority opinion of "minimal requirements of
due process" it would not. 2 ' Justice Stevens also clearly pointed out
that if a "[s]tate adopts a clemency procedure as an integral part of its
system for finally determining whether to deprive a person of life, that
procedure must comport with the Due Process Clause.' 1 21 He also
points out that the death punishment should be given greater
protec122 "It is of
tion than liberty because of both its severity and finality.
vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death
sentence be ... based on reason rather than
23
caprice or emotion.'
The Woodard case is extremely important to the Texas clemency
procedure because it reveals the disposition of the Justices as to the
issue. The case reveals that a majority of the Justices 124 will most
likely agree that there must be some sort of minimal due process requirement for state clemency procedures. The exact nature of the requirement is yet to be determined but arguably, a state must provide
some due process. The question then turns to whether Texas provides
that minimal due process.
B.

Texas Courts Stand on the Process

The Texas court system has recently taken up the issue in several
cases brought to test the clemency procedure in Texas. Once the
clemency procedure in Texas was placed in the spotlight, the Pardons
and Paroles Board was bombarded by lawsuits.125 On November 30,
1998, a state district judge ruled that the Board's procedures violated
the State Constitution and Open Meetings Act. 126 Judge Paul Davis
ordered the Board to make public its meetings, to deliberate clemency
petitions, to vote in public, and record reasoning. 27 The Texas
Supreme Court blocked Judge Davis' order 128 and so attorneys for
120. Id. at 290.
121. Id. at 292.
122. See id. at 294 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977)).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 288-90 (Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer,).
125. See Jim Henderson, Clemency Procedures Under Fire: The Case of a Canadian
Man on Texas' Death Row Sparks Debate in Federal Court, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 22,
1998, at D13.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. The Texas Supreme Court dismissed the order as moot. See also In Re
Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 989 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. 1998).
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Danny Lee Barber and Joseph Stanley Faulder brought an action in
federal court.129 After an intense series of hearings, Judge Sam
Sparks upheld the Texas clemency procedures, but in his nineteenpage order the judge lambasted the process, calling it "extremely poor
and certainly minimal."13 He urged the Board to change its methods,
but noted repeatedly that the Supreme Court only requires minimal
due process.131 Barber and Faulder also sued in state district court
just after the ruling by Sparks. 32 State District Judge Scott McCown
of Austin also held that the Constitution of Texas did not require public hearings or stated reasons for their recommendation to the governor. 13 3 Judge McCown echoed the sentiments of Federal Judge Sparks
in his ruling, "What is troubling to this court is that the Board of Pardons and Paroles never meets to consider any petition for clemency. . .. ,,134 Although the courts have recently upheld the Pardons
and Paroles Board methods, neither Judge Sparks nor Judge McCown
expressed any confidence or pleasure with the clemency process.
Both Judges recognized a drastic need for improvement.
IV.

THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The current procedures of the Pardons and Paroles Board are in
desperate need of change. History is clear that the power of clemency
should be vested in the executive and dispensed with care. 35 Every
other state in the union has some sort of guidelines as to how the
power is regulated.136 In Texas, the Pardons and Paroles Board must
make a recommendation before the governor can even consider the
merits of the case.

37

The Paroles Board is under no obligation to

exercise any factors in a consideration; 38 its members are allowed to
meet in private or by telephone. 39 No record is kept and the Board is
not required to have a reason. 40 If a board member wishes to simply
129. See Henderson, supra note 125 at D13. Faulder has also gathered national
attention because he is a Canadian national. His execution has stirred international
treaty debate. Canadian officials argue that his execution violates certain treaties between Canada and the United States due to the latter's failure to contact the Canadian consulate upon the suspect's arrest. See id.
130. See Moritz, supra note 82, at lA.
131. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272.
132. See Henderson, supra note 125, at D13.
133. See John Moritz, State Wins Decision on ParoleHearings, FORT WORTH STARTELEGRAM, Jan. 9, 1999, at lB.
134. Moritz, supra note 82, at 1A (noting that lawyers arguing the case also asked
the judge to award them $122,000 in attorney's fees for their efforts in challenging the
clemency process in Texas); see also John Moritz, Lawyers Pressing Clemency Issue
Ask for Over $122,000, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 8, 1999, at lB.
135. See Silverman, supra note 8, at 390.
136. See GUIDE TO STATE CLEMENCY, supra note 44.
137. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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"flip a coin" then nothing in the current law would bar them from
doing so. 4 ' There are no deliberations, and since 1993, the Board has
rejected 75 of 76 requests.14 2
If clemency is never granted, then at least the system is the same for
all. If the Governor chooses to grant one application and not another,
then there must be some accountability as to how the power is used.
Any argument that clemency is to be only used in questions of guilt is
inherently flawed, because under the law the jury determines whether
inmates are guilty.1 43 United States District Judge Sam Sparks openly
criticized the clemency process: "What is the horror of a hearing,
since a majority of the other states require a hearing? I do not understand the1' 44
resistance. For God's Sakes, (you) don't want to have a
hearing.'
It is unclear how the rash of lawsuits will affect the Paroles Board.
While recent court rulings in Texas uphold the constitutionality of the
Paroles Board's actions, 4 5 these rulings act as a floor rather than a
ceiling on due process requirements. The Pardons and Paroles Board
must take its own initiative and change its manner of doing things. It
has the ability to make these changes of its own volition, before the
legislature changes things for it. State Representative Elliott Naishtat
(D-Austin) has legislation pending that would require the Paroles
Board to conduct public meetings and develop criteria to guide the
panel when it considers clemency issues. 1 46 Nothing requires that it
grant clemency, but if it wishes its credibility to withstand attack, then
it must at least offer some sort of criteria and consistency. One of the
cornerstones of American jurisprudence lies in the faith of the public.
Where can the public derive this faith, if there is no public meeting,
deliberation, or reasoning?
One should never criticize the status quo unless there are apparent
means of improvement. In this current controversy, there are clearly
some ideas that would vastly improve the current state of the Pardons
and Paroles Board in Texas. In addition, it is unnecessary to look
outside of the United States. Most of the other states 147 have created
a clemency board that rises above the one set by the Texas
Legislature.
141. See id.
142. See Mortiz, supra note 82, at lB. The board members do not meet to discuss
their reasoning. They simply call or fax in their votes. See id.
143. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 36.13 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998). "Jury
is judge of facts. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the jury is the exclusive
judge of the facts, but it is bound to receive the law from the court and be governed
thereby." Id.
144. See Mike Ward, Clemency Process Secrecy Scorned, AUSTIN AM-STATESMAN,
Dec. 22, 1998, at Al.
145. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 36.13 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
146. See Tex. H.B. 397, 7 6th Leg., R.S. (1999).
147. See GUIDE TO STATE CLEMENCY, supra note 44; see also TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. § 11 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1998).
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First, the Pardons and Paroles Board must clearly outline guidelines
for the granting of clemency. Second, it must begin meeting in the
open. Last, it must make known its reasoning for granting or denying
clemency for "[h]e who conceals his disease cannot expect to be
'
cured."148
If the Board chooses never to grant clemency, then so be it,
but as government officials they must allow their decision-making process to be revealed.
CONCLUSION

The State of Texas is known across the country as a fierce proponent of the death penalty. Capital punishment is the most severe punishment known to man. A great debate has raged in this country over
whether the death penalty is a deterrent of crime or a huge blight on
the criminal justice system. Traditionally, clemency is an act of grace
from the executive toward the condemned. In recent years, it has become a tool to measure the guilt of the accused. In 1998, Texas Governor George W. Bush commuted the death sentence of a selfprofessed murderer of over 600 people. While that number is extremely large, and it is very hard to believe that one individual killed
that many people, it is not hard to believe that he killed one. A jury
of twelve citizens convicted Henry Lee Lucas of the brutal murder of
Orange Socks. His case made its way through our justice system and
his guilt was endorsed by several levels of appeals. In the end, he was
granted clemency because the Governor and the Pardons and Paroles
Board doubted his guilt. Doesn't this act simply replace the court system's determination with the judgment of the governor? If the governor can decide guilt or innocence, why the need for a jury?
At the other end of the spectrum, a born-again Christian and model
prisoner was denied clemency because the Governor had no doubt
about her guilt. These two cases converged in 1998 and drastically
changed the view of clemency in Texas. The Governor and Pardons
and Paroles Board of Texas have a tremendous power that is grossly
unregulated. They hold in their hands the power to stop an execution,
but there are absolutely no guidelines for the exercise of that power.
The Constitution of the United States guarantees due process for
every individual. This due process requirement should also extend to
clemency.
Allen L. Williamson

148. RHODA
99 (1970).
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